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ARGUMENT
L

PETITIONER ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
The City claims Guenon failed to make any "attempt whatsoever to marshal the

evidence that supported the City's factual findings." (See Brief of Respondent, pg. 13).
That is clearly not the case. In his opening brief, Guenon recited nearly six pages of facts
and testimony elicited at the Appeals Board hearing. (See Brief of Petitioner, pg. 3-9).
Most of Guenon's contentions on appeal are legal in nature and do not directly
relate to evidence elicited at the Appeals Board hearing. To the extent Guenon failed to
marshal evidence, however, it is because the City presented such scant evidence at the
hearing. Indeed, this Court has found that there is no need to painstakingly marshal every
scrap of evidence under such circumstances:
There is, in effect, no need for an appellant to marshal the evidence
when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be
meaningfully challenged as factual determinations. In other words,
the way to attack findings which appear to be complete and which
are sufficiently detailed is to marshal the supporting evidence and
then demonstrate the evidence is inadequate to sustain such findings.
But where the findings are not of that caliber, appellant need not go
through a futile marshaling exercise. Rather, appellant can simply
argue the legal insufficiency of the court's findings as framed.
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477-478 (Utah App. 1991). Out of an abundance of
caution, Guenon will address the City's marshaling argument with respect to each of the
four issues identified by the City in its opening brief.

1

A. Issue No. 1: Identification Cards.
Guenon does not contest the City's written policy on the handling of evidence.
Nor does Guenon dispute the finding that he failed to book identification cards into
evidence in accordance with that policy. Guenon is not required to marshal evidence on
issues he does not contest.
Guenon's sole contention on appeal is that it was the common practice within the
Department for officers to ignore the evidence policy, often leaving identification cards
lying around the police station, in their vehicles, and in the wastebasket. Although the
violating officers' direct superiors knew this was going on, they felt it was a common
practice and therefore never disciplined the offending officers. R. 75: pg. 228 (5-19); R.
93: pg. 301 (2-25). Because the City elicited no evidence at the hearing to contradict
these points, there was nothing for Guenon to marshal on appeal.
Despite abundant, undisputed evidence that Guenon merely followed the common
practice of the Department, the Appeals board found "that [Guenon's] violation of the
General Order regarding evidence and property was substantially more significant than
what other officers may have done..." {See Finding of Fact No. 8 attached as Addendum
B to Petitioner's Brief). However, the City presented no evidence that Guenon's conduct
was more significant than that of other officers. Accordingly, there was no evidence to
marshal. Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477-478.
B. Issue No. 2: Theft and Misappropriation of Property.
Again, Guenon does not dispute that he downloaded onto his personal disk
photographs that another employee had uploaded onto a City-owned computer later
2

assigned to Guenon, or that he stored the disk at his residence. Guenon is challenging the
Appeals Board's finding that "taking, copying and distributing photos to others may be
an act of theft and misappropriation of property of another..." and "an employee does not
have the right to copy files from the city's computer and possess them." (See Findings of
Fact Nos. 10 and 11 attached as Addendum B to Petitioner's Brief).
The City did not present a shred of evidence to support such findings. It did not
state the elements of theft

and misappropriation.

The terms "theft"

and

"misappropriation" are not defined in the City policy manual. Moreover, Guenon's
conduct does not rise to the level of theft as the term is defined in the Utah Criminal
Code. Again, there was no evidence to marshal on this issue.
C. Issue No. 3: Pornography.
The City asserts that Guenon failed to marshal Sgt. Hodgkinson's testimony that
"at least three of the pornographic video files...had been opened and viewed again after
the files were originally downloaded to Petitioner's computer, as recently as July 27,
2008." (See Brief of Respondent, pg. 7, Fact No. 20) (emphasis added). However, this
testimony was later recanted on cross-examination:
Mr. Hancey: Is it your understanding that that is Officer Guenon's
personal email account?
Sgt. Hodgkinson: Yes.
Mr. Hancey: Okay. Is it fair to say then that this is an image that
was emailed to Officer Guenon on his personal email account?
Sgt. Hodgkinson: I can't say that for sure, whether it was emailed to
him or whether he downloaded it from somewhere and emailed to
somebody else.
3

Mr. Hancey: But, it did, it was transmitted from his email account?
Sgt. Hodgkinson: Yes.
Mr. Hancey: Either coming or going?
Sgt. Hodgkinson: Yes.
Mr. Hancey: And, you don't know which, which it is?
Sgt. Hodgkinson: No. I do not. I can tell you it was last accessed
on the 27th of July.
R.29:pg. 114(24-25)-pg. 115(1-21).
Thus, the final state of Sgt. Hodgkinson's testimony was that the images were
"accessed" on July 27, 2008, not "opened and viewed." Sgt. Hodgkinson admitted that
"accessed" could mean the content was sent by a third party to Guenon's email account.
Guenon was not obligated to marshal testimony that was later recanted by the witness and
that does not support the Appeals Board's findings.
D. Issue No. 6: Proportionality.
Guenon has challenged the Appeals Board's finding that termination was
proportionate to the five offenses he allegedly committed.

There is no evidence to

marshal on this legal question. Furthermore, the City does not identify what facts it
believes Guenon failed to marshal on this point.
II.

VOLUME OF IDENTIFICATION CARDS DOES NOT WARRANT
DISPARATE TREATMENT OF PETITIONER.
In his opening brief, Guenon contends that he should not be disciplined for

violating a policy when it is common practice among Department officers to do so
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without being disciplined. In response, the City cites Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 116
P.3d 973 (Utah App. 2005). Harmon is distinguishable from this case.
In Harmon, a fire captain named Daniel Harmon had violated a department policy
by allowing male subordinates to engage in sexual horseplay while on the job. In the
subsequent administrative proceeding, the Ogden Civil Service Commission disregarded
the incident on the basis that the "horseplay occurred frequently for several years without
complaint." Id at 977-978. On appeal, this Court disagreed, holding that a policy
violation is not justifiable merely because it is "common and consensual among the
participants." Id.
Thus, Harmon dealt with a commanding officer who had allowed his subordinates
to violate a department policy over a long period of time. In this case, Guenon is a
subordinate. He, along with several other officers, had engaged in the practice of storing
identification cards in their vehicles, leaving them lying around the police station, and
throwing them away. Guenon and other subordinate officers were thus led to believe that
their conduct, while technically a violation, was nevertheless acceptable. The evidence at
the Appeals Board hearing was that while supervisors were aware of the policy
violations, nobody was ever disciplined except Guenon.1

While the City contends the police chief did not know about the ongoing, prevalent
violation of the evidence policy, it is undisputed that at least two police sergeants knew
the officers under their control were violating the policy but failed to issue any discipline
or, apparently, report the conduct to their superiors. R. 75: pg. 228 (5-19); R. 93: pg. 301
(2-25).
5

Furthermore, without any evidentiary support, the Appeals Board found that
"[Guenon's] violation of the General Order regarding evidence and property was
substantially more significant than what other officers may have done..." {See Finding
of Fact No. 8 attached as Addendum B to Petitioner's Brief).

Notably, the City's

evidence policy is not qualified by the length of time involved or the number of
evidentiary items not booked into evidence.

R. 265.

Failing to book even one

identification card into evidence would be a violation of the policy as written, but prior to
Guenon the City had never disciplined officers for doing just that. R. 23: pg. 89 (8-25);
R. 183-184.
III.

THE CITY FAILS TO CITE TO ANY EVIDENCE SHOWING
PETITIONER COMMITTED THEFT OR MISAPPROPRIATION AS
DEFINED BY THE UTAH CRIMINAL CODE.
When the City terminated Guenon's employment, it provided him with a

Disciplinary Order outlining five specific reasons for the termination. R. 222-224. That
Order states, in relevant part:
[Guenon] found and otherwise possessed private personal property,
namely, a DVD/CD. [Guenon] admitted making copies of it and
distributed these copies to other individuals. This is an act of theft
and misappropriation ofproperty of another. This act is in violation
of Police Department General Order 6.01.4 and City Policy
Standards of Conduct, page 61.
R. 222. (emphasis added). On the other hand, the Appeals Board did not find Guenon
had committed theft. It found that "taking, copying and distributing photos to others may
be an act of theft and misappropriation of property of another..." and that "an employee
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does not have the right to copy files from the city's computer and possess them." (See
Findings of Fact Nos. 10 and 11 attached as Addendum B to Petitioner's Brief).
The role of the Appeals Board is to either uphold or reject the City's findings
supporting the termination. Indeed, "the [Appeals Board's] role is simply to affirm or
reverse the police chiefs decision, and it lacks the power to modify or remand." Salt
Lake City Corp, v. Salt Lake City Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 908 P.2d 871, 875 (Utah App.
1995); see also Utah Code Ann. 10-3-1106(3)(b)(ii), stating "... the appeal board shall
forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and
determine the matter which relates to the cause for the discharge... . (emphasis added).
The Appeals Board cannot unilaterally modify the City's stated reasons for termination.
Thus, the limit of the Appeals Board's authority was to determine whether Guenon had
committed theft or misappropriation. Because the Appeals Board went beyond that limit
and entered a different finding, the finding is improper on its face.
Guenon recognizes that the City was not required to prove Guenon guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. However, the City did not even submit substantial evidence to
support the allegation that Guenon committed theft. Because the City's policy manual
does not define the terms "theft" and "misappropriation," one is left to assume that the
statutory definitions in the Utah Criminal Code apply. At the Appeals Board hearing, the
City neither stated the elements of those offenses nor made any attempt to elicit evidence
to support them. The undisputed evidence was that Guenon downloaded the photographs
onto a disk he owned. There was no evidence that the owner of the photographs was ever
deprived of his or her property, a required element of theft. Utah Code Ann. 76-6-404.
7

The Appeals Board's confusion is apparent given its finding that copying photographs
"may" be an act of theft.

(See Finding of Fact No. 10 attached as Addendum B to

Petitioner's Opening Brief)
IV.

THE CITY FAILS TO CITE TO ANY EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER
THAT SHOWS PETITIONER INTENTIONALLY VIEWED
PORNOGRAPHY.
The City asserts there is substantial evidence to prove Guenon intentionally

viewed pornography because Guenon "accessed" the same pornographic images on two
or three occasions. (Brief of Respondent, pg. 19). The City avoids the issue of whether
the images were sent unsolicited to Guenon via email or the Instant Messenger program.
The City's sole witness on this issue, Sgt. Hodgkinson, believed the images were
transmitted through Guenon's email account.

He did not know, however, whether

Guenon had sent the images or if they had been sent to him. R. 29: pg. 114 (24-25)-pg.
115(1-21).
Guenon flatly denied ever downloading or soliciting pornographic images, and
stated that on the occasions he had received them unsolicited from third-parties he
immediately deleted them. R. 62: pg. 174 (24-25); pg. 175-176. Parsons Metzkow
testified that the pornographic images found on Guenon's computer were consistent with
the instant messenger emoticons other officers had used to disclose their identity. R. 83:
pg. 258 (1-24). Therefore, the Appeals Board's finding that Guenon violated the City's
policy against pornography was not supported by substantial evidence.
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V.

THE CITY MAY NOT DISCIPLINE PETITIONER FOR FAILING TO
FOLLOW THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IN REPORTING VIOLATIONS
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE ATF.
The City argues Guenon was not disciplined for reporting violations to the

Attorney General and ATF but because he failed to follow the chain of command in
doing so. The City's current position directly contradicts the reasons the City identified
in its Disciplinary Order to Guenon:
[Guenon] committed at least two known separate acts of
insubordination by failing to follow the chain of command by doing
the following:
Failure to follow chain of command, namely delivery of a
DVD/CD to the attorney general's office and making
complaints against fellow officers. (Department Policy No.
106.5.) (City Policy Standards of Conduct, page 61.)
Reporting of alleged ATF violations to ATF in lieu of
reporting the violations to City personnel. (Department
Policy No. 106.5.) (City Policy Standards of Conduct, page
61)
R. 222-224 (emphasis added). The language is unequivocal: the City terminated Guenon
for delivering the CD to the Attorney General in furtherance of a criminal complaint and
for reporting safety violations to the ATF rather than to the City.
Again, the Appeals Board must either uphold or deny Guenon's termination based
on the City's original findings; it cannot unilaterally modify the City's stated reasons by
qualifying that Guenon was terminated only for failing to follow the chain of command.
Woodward, 908 P.2d at 875. Furthermore, even if Guenon was terminated for failing to
follow the chain of command, that constitutes a violation of the Utah Protection of Public
Employees Act.

The City cannot take any adverse action in response to employee
9

whistle blowing, whether that action is direct or indirect. A contrary finding would allow
the City to circumvent the purpose of the Act, which is to promote whistle blowing for
violations of law and to protect civil servants who do so from retaliation.
The City also contends Guenon is exempt from protection under the Act because
he did not report the violations in good faith. The Act provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
An employer may not take adverse action against an employee...
[who] communicates in good faith the existence of any waste...or
suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation...
Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-3(l)(a). The term "good faith" is not explicitly defined in the
Act but the requirement can reasonably be interpreted in only two ways: (1) the reporter
must truly believe that the violation he is reporting has occurred; or (2) the reporter must
have an altruistic motive for reporting a violation. The first interpretation makes much
more sense in the context of the purpose and intent of the Act; namely, to encourage
employees to report safety and legal violations and to prevent retaliation against those
who do. Hall v. Utah State Dept. of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958, 964 (Utah 2001).
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-3(l)(b) states in relevant part:
For purposes of Subsection (a), an employee is presumed to have
communicated in good faith if he gives written notice or otherwise
formally communicates the waste, violation, or reasonable suspicion
to the state auditor. This presumption may be rebutted by showing
that the employee knew or reasonably ought to have known that the
report is malicious, false, or frivolous.
(emphasis added).

While not precisely on point (Guenon did not involve the state

auditor), this provision provides great insight into what the Utah legislature intended by
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including the term "good faith". Guenon formally communicated his concerns to both
the Attorney General and the ATF and should be presumed to have acted in good faith.
Accordingly, Guenon should be protected under the Act unless the City can furnish
evidence that Guenon "knew or reasonably ought to have known that the report is
malicious, false, or frivolous." There is no such evidence on the record.
The State of Idaho has a whistleblower statue that contains nearly identical
language to Utah' s statute:
[An employee] communicates in good faith if there is a reasonable
basis in fact for the communication. Good faith is lacking where the
employee knew or reasonably ought to have known that the report is
malicious, false or frivolous.
Idaho Code § 6-2104(l)(b) (emphasis added). In analyzing this language, the Idaho
Supreme Court has determined that the personal motivations of the reporter are irrelevant
so long as the underlying grounds for the report have a good faith basis:
Some courts have required that 'we must not look only at the
contents of the report, but also at the reporter's purpose in making
the report.' Dahlberg, 625 N.W.2d at 254. For instance, the
whistleblower statutes of some states require that, as an element of
good faith, the employee not take the actions for personal gain or
consideration. See e.g. Cipriani, 111 F.Supp.2d at 331; Albright v.
City of Philadelphia, 399 F.Supp.2d 575, 595-96 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
However, the Idaho whistleblower act does not contain similar
language. Therefore, although it may fall into the overall
consideration of whether she acted in good faith or not, the fact that
[Appellant] was hoping to gain personally from reporting the waste
of [co-workers] does not foreclose a finding that her actions were
protected by the Idaho whistleblower act.
Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, --- P.3d —, 2008 WL 4595239 (Idaho 2008).
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Likewise, Utah's whistleblower statute does not contain language requiring an
employee to report with only the purest of intentions. Therefore, the only consideration
should be whether Guenon had a good faith belief that violations of the law had occurred,
and all of the available evidence suggests he did. Guenon's undisputed testimony is that
he reviewed the photographs and believed the actions depicted in them met the elements
of the "lewdness involving a child,5' a class A misdemeanor. The fact that the Attorney
General declined to prosecute has no bearing whatsoever on Guenon's subjective belief.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that the City had improperly stored explosives. Finally, it
should be pointed out that the City does not attempt to argue that Guenon lacked a good
faith belief in the truthfulness of either of his reports.
VI.

PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW BY
THIS COURT.
The City argues that termination was an appropriate and proportionate level of

discipline, noting Guenon's failure to identify another officer who has been disciplined
for the combination of mishandling identification cards, stealing photographs, viewing
pornography, and making reports to the Attorney General and ATF. That is not the
proper standard. As this Court has held:

2

Before reporting to the ATF, Guenon reported his concerns about the ATF violation to
his direct supervisor, Officer Rapella. R. 74: pg. 222 (18-25)-pg. 223 (1-7). Guenon also
testified that he knew his supervisors were aware of the violation but that nothing was
being done to rectify the violation. R. 69: pg. 202 (18-25). Capt. Shreeve admitted that
he knew about the violation but that he had "other pressing matters" to deal with at the
time. R. 23: pg. 89 (8-25); R. 183-184. This is further evidence that Guenon had a good
faith belief in what he reported to the ATF.
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It should not be feared that a party who is severely punished, but has
no history of inconsistency to turn to, is without recourse. While the
party may have no basis to claim disparity, the party still retains the
protection of proportionality review.
Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Com% 8 P.3d 1048, 1057 (Utah App. 2000).
Despite the fact that Guenon may not be able to point to another case of discipline
identical to his own, he is still entitled to a fair and unbiased proportionality review by
this Court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Guenon respectfully requests that this Court overturn
the Appeals Board's findings upholding the City's termination of Guenon.

Guenon

further requests that he be reinstated as a Midvale City police officer with back pay and
full benefits from the date of his termination until the time of reinstatement.
DATED this (5*^ day of September, 2009.
KESLER & RUST

Ryan EliHiancxy /
Attorneys for Petitioner
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